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Evaluating competing public policy approaches towards the informal 
economy: some lessons from the United Kingdom 
 
Colin C Williams, Ioana A Horodnic and Lynda Burkinshaw 
 
 
Abstract 
Purpose 
Conventionally, participation in the informal economy has been explained by viewing 
citizens as rational economic actors participating when the pay-off is greater than the 
expected cost of being caught and punished, and thus tackled by raising the sanctions and 
risks of detection. Given that many citizens do not engage even when the benefits outweigh 
the costs, a new social actor approach has begun to emerge which explains the informal 
economy as arising when tax morality is low and seeks to foster commitment to compliance. 
The aim of this paper is to provide an evidence-based evaluation of these competing policy 
approaches. 
 
Methodology 
To do so, the results are reported of 1,306 face-to-face interviews undertaken during 2013 in 
the United Kingdom.  
  
Findings 
The finding is that raising the sanctions and risks of detection has no significant impact on the 
likelihood of participation in the informal sector. However, participation in the informal 
economy is significantly associated with tax morality. Indeed, the only time that increasing 
the sanctions and risks of detection reduces the level of participation in the informal economy 
is amongst citizens with very low tax morality.   
 
Practical Implications 
Rather than continue with the current rational economic actor approach of increasing the 
penalties and risks of detection, this case study of the UK reveals that a new policy approach 
is required that seeks to improve tax morality by introducing measures to reduce the 
acceptability of participating in the informal economy. Whether this is more widely 
applicable now needs to be tested, given the dominance throughout the world of this punitive 
rational economic actor approach. 
 
Originality/value 
This paper provides evidence supporting a new social actor approach towards explaining and 
tackling participation in the informal economy.  
 
Keywords: informal sector; hidden economy; tax evasion; tax morale; United Kingdom 
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Introduction 
Across the world, employers exploit the advantages of the informal economy in various ways 
to reduce their labour costs, such as by employing off-the-books workers, outsourcing to the 
informal economy or under-reporting the wages of their formal employees (Williams, 2014). 
This has significant deleterious consequences. Economies lose competitiveness because 
productive formal enterprises witness unfair competition from unproductive informal 
enterprises (Leal Ordóñez, 2014), governments lose regulatory control over work conditions 
(ILO, 2014) and tax revenue (Bajada and Schneider, 2005), and customers lack legal 
recourse and certainty that health and safety regulations have been followed (Williams and 
Martinez, 2014). Informal workers, moreover, lack entitlement to labour rights such as the 
minimum wage and sick pay, cannot build up rights to the state pension and access 
occupational pension schemes, and lack access to health and safety standards as well as 
bargaining rights and voice (Andrews et al., 2011; European Commission, 2007; TUC, 2008).  
 Although there is a growing understanding of the extent, character and impacts of the 
informal economy both in the UK and the wider world (ILO, 2014; Williams, 2015), with 
estimates suggesting that the UK informal economy is equivalent to some 10 per cent of GDP 
(Murphy, 2014; Schneider and Williams, 2013), there has been less attention paid to 
evaluating how this sphere can be explained and tackled. The aim of this paper, therefore, is 
to evaluate different ways of explaining and tackling the informal economy. 
 Until now, a rational economic actor perspective has been dominant which views 
participation in the informal sector as occurring when the pay-off is greater than the expected 
cost of being caught and punished (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972), resulting in governments 
increasing the actual or perceived penalties and risks of detection so as to deter participation. 
However, recognising that many citizens voluntarily comply even when the pay-off from the 
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informal sector is greater than the expected costs (Alm et al., 2010; Kirchler, 2007; Murphy, 
2008), a ³social actor´ perspective has emerged which views participation in the informal 
sector as arising when there is low tax morality, defined as the intrinsic motivation to pay 
taxes (Cummings et al., 2009). A resultant discussion has been whether the conventional 
rational economic actor perspective needs to be either replaced or combined with an approach 
that elicits greater voluntary commitment to compliant behaviour by improving tax morality 
(Alm and Torgler, 2011; Torgler, 2012). Here, an evidence-based evaluation is conducted of 
these competing policy approaches. 
 To advance understanding, the next section reviews the rational economic actor and 
social actor perspectives and also whether they can be combined. To provide an evidence-
based evaluation of these approaches, the third section then introduces the data and 
methodology, namely a logistic regression analysis of 1,306 face-to-face interviews 
conducted in 2013 in the UK. The fourth section reports the findings, revealing no association 
between participation in the informal sector and the perceived level of penalties and risk of 
detection, but a significant positive association between participation in the informal sector 
and the level of tax morality, along with how the impact of deterrents on the likelihood of 
participation is moderated by the level of tax morality. The fifth and final section then 
concludes by discussing the theoretical and policy implications. 
 In theoretical terms, the significant contribution of this paper therefore, is that it is the 
first known evaluation in a UK context of the rational economic actor and social actor 
approaches towards explaining and tackling the informal economy, along with whether they 
can be combined. In doing so, not only are theorisations of the distribution of the informal 
economy advanced, but also a significant shift advocated in policy towards tackling the 
informal economy away from the conventional rational economic actor approach focused on 
deterrents and towards a social actor approach focused upon improving tax morality. 
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 Before commencing, however, the informal economy needs to be defined. Here, we 
define it as paid activity that is legal in all respects other than it is not declared to the 
authorities for tax, social security or labour law purposes (European Commission, 2007; 
OECD, 2012; Williams, 2014). If it is not legal in all other respects, it is not part of the 
informal economy. If the goods or services traded are illegal for instance (e.g., illegal drugs), 
then it is not part of the informal economy, but the wider criminal economy.   
 
Competing public policy approaches towards the informal economy 
 
Reviewing the literature, two distinct ways of explaining and tackling the informal economy 
can be discerned. Here, each is considered in turn along with whether they can be combined. 
 
Rational economic actor approach 
The original source of the rational economic actor approach is the classic utilitarian theory of 
crime that views citizens as participating when the expected costs (i.e., the penalty and 
probability of being caught) are outweighed by the benefits (Bentham, 1788). Becker (1968) 
popularised this arguing that by increasing the risks of detection and penalties facing those 
considering or actually flouting the law, acting legally would become a rational choice for 
citizens. Allingham and Sandmo (1972) then applied this to tax evasion, viewing the non-
compliant as doing so because the benefits outweighed the expected costs of being caught 
and punished. To alter the cost/benefit ratio facing those participating or thinking about 
engaging in tax evasion, it was asserted that the actual and/or perceived sanctions and risks of 
detection had to be increased. This way of explaining and tackling the informal economy was 
subsequently widely adopted (Grabiner, 2000; Hasseldine and Li, 1999; Richardson and 
Sawyer, 2001). 
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 However, despite the dominance of this perspective, the evidence that increasing the 
penalties and risks of detection reduces participation in the informal economy is mixed. 
Although some assert that increasing the risks of detection diminishes participation in the 
informal economy, at least for some income groups (Klepper and Nagin, 1989; Slemrod et 
al., 2001) and that increasing sanctions diminishes engagement in the informal economy 
(Wenzel, 2004), others find that increasing the probability of detection does not result in less 
non-compliance (Shaw et al., 2008) and that increasing sanctions leads to either greater 
participation, has no effect, or only short-term effects (Feld and Frey, 2002; Murphy, 2005; 
Spicer and Lunstedt, 1976). To evaluate the validity of this rational economic actor 
perspective, therefore, the following hypothesis can be tested: 
   
Rational economic actor hypothesis (H1): the higher are the perceived penalties and 
probability of detection, the lower is the likelihood of participation in the informal 
economy, ceteris paribus. 
H1a: the higher are the perceived penalties, the lower is the likelihood of participation 
in the informal economy, ceteris paribus. 
H1b: the higher is the perceived probability of detection, the lower is the likelihood of 
participation in the informal economy, ceteris paribus. 
 
Social actor approach 
Given that many citizens voluntarily comply even when the perceived sanctions and 
probabilities of detection suggest that they should not, the rational economic actor 
perspective has begun to be questioned (Alm et al., 2010; Murphy, 2008). Consequently, to 
explain and tackle the informal economy, a perspective has emerged which views citizens as 
social actors and explains participation in the informal economy to be a result of low tax 
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morality, by which is meant a low intrinsic motivation to pay taxes (Alm and Torgler, 2006, 
2011; Cummings et al., 2009; McKerchar et al., 2013; Torgler, 2011; Torgler and Schneider, 
2007). The resultant goal is to improve the commitment of citizens to voluntarily comply by 
seeking to enhance tax morality (Kirchler, 2007; Torgler, 2011).    
 The origins of this social actor approach can be traced back to Georg von Schanz 
(1890) who was one of the first scholars to highlight the tax contract between citizens and the 
state. Some six decades later, the German ³Cologne school of tax psychology´ then 
popularised this approach and developed measures of the level of tax morality (Schmölders, 
1962; Strümpel, 1969). Although this social actor approach then went into abeyance with the 
emergence of the rational economic actor approach from the 1970s, the new millennium has 
witnessed its re-emergence (Alm et al., 2012; Kirchler, 2007; Torgler, 2011).  
 In this social actor approach, compliance is sought through engendering greater 
voluntary commitment to compliant behaviour by building a high trust, high commitment 
culture that aligns the values of citizens with the formal rules so as to engender greater self-
regulation (Alm and Torgler, 2011; Torgler, 2012). This sits in stark contrast to the rational 
economic actor approach where deterrents are used to engender compliance through the close 
supervision and monitoring of citizens, the imposition of tight rules, prescribed procedures 
and centralised structures in a low commitment, low trust and adversarial culture. 
 Indeed, such an approach can be read through the lens of institutional theory (North, 
1990). Institutions represent ³the rules of the game´, prescribing what activities are 
acceptable (Baumol and Blinder, 2008; Denzau and North 1994; Mathias et al., 2014; North, 
1990). All societies have both formal institutions (i.e., codified laws and regulations) that 
define the legal rules of the game (prescribing ³state morality´) as well as informal 
institutions which are the ³socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, 
communicated and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels´ (Helmke and 
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Levitsky, 2004: 727), prescribing ³civic morality´. From this social actor perspective, 
participation in the informal economy arises when there is a gap between the formal 
institutions (³state morality´) and informal institutions (³civic morality´), which is measured 
by the level of tax morality, and the consequent goal is to better align civic morality with 
state morality so as to reduce engagement in the informal economy. To evaluate this 
approach in consequence, the following hypothesis can be tested: 
 
Social actor hypothesis (H2): the higher the tax morality, the lower is the likelihood of 
participation in the informal economy, ceteris paribus. 
 
 
Combining the approaches  
In the UK, akin to most developed nations, the rational economic actor perspective has been 
dominant, with the informal economy primarily being tackled by increasing the risks of 
detection and sanctions (Dekker et al., 2010; Grabiner, 2000; National Audit Office, 2008). 
Less attention has been paid to the social actor approach of improving tax morality, despite 
the mixed evidence on whether the rational economic actor perspective is effective.  
These two approaches, however, are not mutually exclusive. The ³slippery slope´ 
approach argues that governments can pursue not only ³enforced´ compliance by increasing 
the penalties and risks of detection and therefore the power of authorities, but also 
³voluntary´ compliance by improving tax morality and therefore trust in authorities (Kirchler 
et al., 2008; Kogler et al., 2015; Kastlunger et al., 2013; Khurana and Diwan, 2014; 
Muehlbacher et al., 2011; Prinz et al., 2013; Wahl et al., 2010). The view is that when there 
is neither trust in authorities and authorities have no power, then participation in the informal 
economy will be higher. When trust in, and/or the power of, authorities increases however, 
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then participation in the informal economy decreases. In a laboratory experiment for 
example, Wahl et al. (2010) randomly present participants with one of four different 
descriptions of a fictitious country, in which the authorities are portrayed on the one hand, as 
either trustworthy or untrustworthy and on the other hand, as either powerful or powerless. 
The finding is that participants paid significantly more taxes when both power and trust were 
high. The result is that a combination of greater trust in authorities and the greater power of 
authorities is asserted to be the most effective way of tackling the informal economy (Kogler 
et al., 2015; Muehlbacher et al., 2011).   
However, there is also an emergent understanding that increasing the power of 
authorities and trust of authorities may have complex interaction effects. Applying higher 
risks of detection and penalties might not always lead to the same outcome. When tax 
morality is high for example, increasing the probability of detection and sanctions might lead 
to greater non-compliance, not least due to a breakdown of trust between the state and its 
citizens (Chang and Lai, 2004; Kirchler et al., 2014). Put another way, the suggestion is that 
tax morality may moderate the effects of increasing the perceived risks of detection and 
penalties on participation in the informal economy. Little if any research, however, has been 
undertaken on such moderating effects. Here, therefore, the following hypothesis can be 
tested:  
 
Moderating effects hypothesis (H3): the higher the tax morality, the smaller the effect 
of perceived penalties and risk of detection on participation in the informal sector, 
ceteris paribus. 
H3a: the higher the tax morality, the smaller the effect of perceived penalties on 
participation in the informal sector, ceteris paribus. 
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H3b: the higher the tax morality, the smaller the effect of perceived risk of detection 
on participation in the informal sector, ceteris paribus. 
 
Methodology 
 
To evaluate these hypotheses, 1,306 face-to-face interviews are reported conducted in the 
United Kingdom as part of Eurobarometer survey no. 402 undertaken in 2013. This used a 
multi-stage random (probability) sampling methodology in order to ensure that on the issues 
of gender, age, region and locality size, both the UK sample as well as each level of the 
sample, was representative in proportion to its population size. Here, therefore, a weighting 
scheme is used which adjusts the British and the Northern Ireland samples to their respective 
proportions of the UK population. For the univariate analysis, in consequence, we use this 
sample weighting scheme as recommended in both the wider literature (Sharon and Liu, 
1994; Solon et al., 2013) and the Eurobarometer methodology, to obtain meaningful 
descriptive results. For the multivariate analysis, in contrast, a debate exists over whether to 
use weighting (Pfefferman, 1994; Sharon and Liu, 1994; Solon et al., 2013; Winship and 
Radbill, 1994). Reflecting the dominant viewpoint, the decision has been here taken not to do 
so.  
 The face-to-face interviews firstly asked participants attitudinal questions regarding 
the acceptability of different types of informal work as well as the expected sanctions and 
risks of detection, followed by questions on whether the participants had purchased from the 
informal economy and finally, whether they had participated in the informal economy over 
the past year. Here, the focus is upon firstly, the attitudinal questions on the acceptability of 
working in the informal economy, which measure the level of tax morality, secondly, their 
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views on the expected sanctions and risks of detection and thirdly, whether they had 
participated in the informal economy.  
 To determine whether increasing the penalties and risks of detection, and higher tax 
morality, reduces the likelihood of participation in the informal economy in the UK, the 
dependent variable used is a dummy variable with recorded value 1 for persons who 
answered ³yes´ to the question: ³Apart from a regular employment, have you yourself carried 
out any undeclared paid activities in the last 12 months?´. 
To evaluate the association between participation in the informal economy and the 
policy approaches, three explanatory variables are used. Firstly, to evaluate whether the 
perceived risk of detection influences engagement, a dummy variable was used describing the 
perceived risk of being detected when participating in the informal economy, with value 0 for 
a very small or fairly small risk and value 1 for a fairly high or very high risk. Secondly, to 
evaluate how penalties are associated with engagement, a dummy variable was used, 
describing the expected sanctions if caught doing work in the informal economy, with value 0 
for those asserting that the normal tax or social security contributions would be due and value 
1 for those stating that the normal tax or social security contributions due, plus there would 
be a fine or imprisonment.  
Third and finally, to evaluate the association between participation in the informal 
economy and tax morality, participants were asked to rate the acceptability of participating in 
six types of work in the informal economy using a 10-point Likert scale (where 1 means 
absolutely unacceptable and 10 means absolutely acceptable), namely: an individual is hired 
by a household for work and s/he does not declare the payment received to the tax or social 
security authorities even though it should be declared; a firm is hired by a household for work 
and it does not declare the payment received to the tax or social security authorities; a firm is 
hired by another firm for work and it does not declare its activities to the tax or social security 
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authorities; a firm hires an individual and all or a part of the wages paid to him/her are not 
officially declared; someone receives welfare payments without entitlement, and someone 
evades taxes by not declaring or only partially declaring their income. After conducting a 
factor analysis (using the Kaiser rule), which grouped the six questions into a single factor, an 
aggregate tax morality index for each individual was constructed E\ FROODWLQJ SDUWLFLSDQWV¶
responses to the six questions. The CronbacK¶V $OSKDFRHIILFLHQW LV 897 which shows an 
excellent internal consistency of the scale (Kline, 2000). Here, the index is represented in the 
original 10-point Likert scale format, meaning that the lower the index value, the higher is 
their tax morality.  
Drawing upon past studies that identify the important socio-demographic and socio-
economic variables determining participation in the informal economy (Williams and Franic, 
2016; Williams and Horodnic, 2015a,b,c,d), the control variables selected are:  
 Gender: a dummy variable with value 0 for females and 1 for males. 
 Age: a continuous variable indicating the exact age of a respondent. 
 Occupation: a categorical variable grouping respondents by their occupation with 
value 1 for self-employed, value 2 for employed, and value 3 for not working. 
 People 15+ years in own household: a categorical variable for people 15+ years in 
respondent`s household (including the respondent) with value 1 for one person, value 
2 for two persons, value 3 for 3 persons or more. 
 Children: a dummy variable for the presence of children up to 14 years old in the 
household with value 0 for individuals with no children and value 1 for those having 
children. 
 Difficulties paying bills: a categorical variable for the respondent difficulties in paying 
bills with value 1 for having difficulties most of the time, value 2 for occasionally, 
and value 3 for almost never/ never. 
12 
 
 Area: a categorical variable for the area where the respondent lives with value 1 for 
rural area or village, value 2 for small or middle sized town, and value 3 for large 
town. 
To evaluate the association between participation in the informal economy and the perceived 
penalties and risk of detection, and the level of tax morality, only those 1,060 respondents for 
whom data on each and every control variable was available are here used in the logistic 
regression analysis. Below, the results are reported. 
 
Findings 
 
Examining the descriptive findings, 3 per cent of participants reported participating in the 
informal economy over the past 12 months. Hence, even if participation in the informal 
economy is a sensitive issue, meaning that this is a lower-bound estimate of the level of 
participation, 1 in 33 UK citizens reported participating in the informal economy in the past 
year. Another previous survey regarding this topic estimates a higher level of participation of 
7 per cent (Pedersen 2003).  
 To analyse the relationship between participation in the informal economy and the 
various policy approaches, Table 1 reveals the differences between those engaged and not 
engaged in the informal economy regarding their perceptions of the risks of detection, the 
expected sanctions if caught and their tax morality. Those participating in the informal 
economy perceive the expected sanctions and risk of detection as lower than those not 
engaging in the informal economy; 30 per cent of those working in the informal economy 
consider that only the normal tax or social security contributions will be due if caught 
compared with just 18 per cent of those not engaged in the informal economy. Those engaged 
in the informal economy and those not engaged however, perceive the risk of being detected 
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very similarly. Participants in the informal economy, nevertheless, have a lower level of tax 
morality (3.9) compared with those not participating (1.9).  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
To evaluate whether these relationships are significant when other control variables are taken 
into account and held constant, as well as the moderating effects of tax morality on the 
effectiveness of sanctions and detection risk, Table 2 reports the results of a logistic 
regression analysis. Before analysing this however, it is important to highlight the findings in 
Table 2 regarding the groups most likely to participate in the informal economy and thus that 
need to be targeted by policy. This reveals that men are significantly more likely to 
participate in the informal economy in the UK than women and so too are younger people, 
and those facing difficulties in paying the household bills. Compared with self-employed 
people, moreover, those employed and those not working are significantly less likely to 
engage in the informal economy.  
Evaluating the approaches and commencing with whether participation in the 
informal economy is associated with the perceived level of penalties when other variables are 
introduced and held constant, no statistically significant association is found. Those 
perceiving the expected sanctions to be higher (i.e. tax or social security contributions plus a 
fine or prison) are not significantly less likely to participate in the informal economy (refuting 
H1a). Similarly, no significant association exists between participation in the informal 
economy and the perceived risk of being detected. Those viewing the risk of being caught as 
fairly high or very high are not less likely to participate in the informal economy compared 
with those viewing the risk as fairly small and very small (refuting H1b). These results thus 
refute in a UK context the rational economic actor perspective which asserts that increasing 
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the actual or perceived penalties and risks of detection reduces the likelihood of participation 
in the informal economy. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Turning to the social actor approach, meanwhile, the finding is that participation in the 
informal economy is significantly associated with the level of tax morality. The direction of 
the association is that the higher the tax morality, the lower is the propensity to participate in 
the informal economy (confirming H2). The outcome of model 1 therefore, is that little or no 
association is found between the likelihood of participating in the informal economy and the 
level of punishments and risk of detection, but an association is identified with the level of 
tax morality. The suggestion, therefore, is that interventions which seek to increase the level 
of punishments and risk of detection will have little influence on participation but policy 
interventions which seek to improve tax morality may well reduce engagement. 
To examine whether tax morality moderates the impacts and effectiveness of penalties 
and detection risk, model 2 in Table 2 introduces the interaction terms between tax morality 
and the level of punishment and risk of detection. Overall, the finding is that the interaction 
terms between perceived penalties and risk of detection, and tax morality, are not significant 
(refuting H3a and H3b). However, although there is overall a lack of significance of the 
interaction terms, some important relationships exist at lower levels of tax morality that need 
to be reported. Figure 1 graphically portrays the impact of increasing the penalties and risks 
of detection on participation in the informal economy at various levels of tax morality for a 
³representative´ UK citizen, derived by taking the mean and modal values of the other 
independent variables. As such, this representative UK citizen is a 47 year-old not working 
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woman, living in a two person household in a small or middle sized town, with no children 
who never, or almost never, faces financial difficulties paying the household bills.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
This displays that among those with low levels of tax morality, the predicted odds of the 
representative citizen engaging in the informal economy is smaller when the penalties and 
risks of detection are higher. That is, when tax morality is relatively high (i.e., below a 
score of 6), the perceived level of sanctions and risks of detection has little if any impact 
on the probability of participation in the informal sector. When tax morality decreases 
above a score of 6, however, the perceived level of punishment and risk of detection has 
an impact; the lower the perceived risk and the lower the expected penalties, the higher is 
the probability of participation in the informal sector. Increasing the perceived risks of 
detection, moreover, has a greater impact on reducing participation than increasing the 
expected punishments. However, as mentioned above, overall, these interaction terms are 
not statistically significant. Table 3 provides a summary of which hypotheses have been 
confirmed and which not.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Recently, the rational economic actor perspective towards explaining and tackling the 
informal economy has been challenged by a social actor perspective. To evaluate the validity 
of this challenge, we have here examined in a UK context whether the expected penalties and 
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risks of detection, as well as level of tax morality, is associated with participation in the 
informal economy. The finding is that engagement in the informal economy does not 
significantly decrease as the perceived level of penalties and risks of detection increase, but 
does so as tax morality improves. This, therefore, tentatively refutes in a UK context the 
conventional rational economic actor perspective and provides support for the social actor 
perspective focused upon improving tax morality. Moreover, although increasing the 
sanctions and risks of detection do reduce the level of participation in the informal economy 
when tax morality is low, overall the interaction effects between the level of tax morality and 
the level of penalties and risks of detection are not significant.   
 In consequence, if participation in the informal economy is to be reduced, it appears 
that the conventional rational economic actor perspective focused on deterrents needs to be 
replaced by a social actor perspective which focuses upon improving tax morality. What 
tools, therefore, can achieve this? Viewing low tax morality through the lens of institutional 
theory as a measure of the lack of alignment of the laws, codes and regulations of formal 
institutions and the norms, beliefs and values of informal institutions (Helmke and Levitsky, 
2004; North, 1990), two changes are necessary.  
 On the one hand, the norms, values and beliefs regarding the acceptability of 
participating in the informal economy need to be altered. This can be achieved by providing 
education about the value and benefits of paying taxes in order to elicit an intrinsic 
motivation to comply. Measures might include not only an annual letter to taxpayers about 
ZKHUH WKHLU WD[HV KDYH EHHQ VSHQW DV LQWURGXFHG LQ WKH 8. LQ  E\ +HU 0DMHVW\¶V
Revenue and Customs (HMRC), but also ³your taxes are paying for this´ signs in hospitals, 
on ambulances and on public construction projects. Advertising campaigns about the benefits 
of working in the formal rather than informal economy can be also used. An evaluation of the 
advertising campaigns run by HMRC reveals a return of 19:1 on the expenditure compared 
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with a return of 4.5: 1 on expenditure detecting those operating in the informal economy 
(National Audit Office, 2008). The above analysis reveals the population groups usefully 
targeted by such campaigns, namely men, younger people, those living in households with 
financial difficulties and the self-employed.  
 On the other hand, alterations in formal institutions are also required. As previous 
studies reveal, compliance rises when there are improvements in procedural justice, which 
refers to whether citizens perceive the government to treat them in a respectful, impartial and 
responsible manner (Gangl et al., 2013; Murphy, 2005), procedural fairness, which refers to 
the extent to which citizens believe that they are paying their fair share compared with others 
(Kirchgässner, 2011; Molero and Pujol, 2012) and redistributive justice, which refers to 
whether citizens believe they receive the goods and services they deserve given the taxes that 
they pay (Kirchgässner, 2011).  
 In sum, if this paper stimulates further evaluations of the different approaches towards 
explaining and tackling the informal economy, as well as the interaction effects, both in 
individual countries and other global regions, then this paper will have fulfilled one of its 
intentions. If this then results in not only the UK government but also others widening the 
range of policy approaches and measures used to tackle the informal economy beyond the 
currently dominant approach of increasing the penalties and risks of detection, then it will 
have fulfilled its wider objective. What is certain, however, is that the UK government and 
others can no longer assume that the conventional rational economic actor approach is the 
way to explain and tackle the informal economy and continue to underplay the potentially 
important role of tax morality.   
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Table 1. Expected sanctions, detection risk and tax morality: by whether respondents 
participate in the informal economy  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 United 
Kingdom 
Western 
Europe 
EU 28 
Engaged in the informal economy (%) 3 4 4 
Expected sanctions (%)    
Tax or social security contributions due 30 26 32 
Tax or social security contributions + fine or 
prison 
70 74 68 
Detection risk (%)    
Very small/ Fairly small    49 70 72 
Fairly high/ Very high 51 30 28 
Tax morality (mean) 3.9 3.7 3.5 
Not engaged in the informal economy (%) 97 96 96 
Expected sanctions (%)    
Tax or social security contributions due 18 19 24 
Tax or social security contributions + fine or 
prison 
82 81 76 
Detection risk (%)    
Very small/ Fairly small    49 59 59 
Fairly high/ Very high 51 41 41 
Tax morality (mean) 1.9 2.1 2.2 
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Table 2. Logistic regressions of the propensity to participate in the informal economy in the 
United Kingdom 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 E  Robust 
se(E) 
Exp(E) E  Robust 
se(E) 
Exp(E) 
Expected sanctions (Tax or social security contributions due)      
Tax or social security contributions + 
fine or prison 
-0.180  0.656 0.835 -0.939  1.159 0.391 
Detection risk (Very small/ Fairly small)         
Fairly high/ Very high -0.832  0.689 0.435 -0.158  1.030 0.854 
Tax morality 0.659 *** 0.118 1.932 0.617 ** 0.296 1.852 
Gender (Female)         
Male 2.954 ** 1.167 19.18 2.885 ** 1.148 17.90 
Age (Exact age) -0.055 *** 0.019 0.946 -0.053 *** 0.018 0.948 
Occupation (Self-employed)         
Employed -1.723 *** 0.631 0.179 -1.661 ** 0.645 0.190 
Not working -1.409 * 0.789 0.245 -1.375 * 0.797 0.253 
People 15+ years in own household (One)        
Two 0.912  1.020 2.490 0.989  1.020 2.688 
Three and more 0.593  0.987 1.809 0.680  0.987 1.975 
Children (No children)           
Having children 0.183  0.759 1.201 0.201  0.756 1.222 
Difficulties paying bills (Most of the time)        
From time to time -2.365 *** 0.917 0.094 -2.367 ** 0.927 0.094 
Almost never/ never -2.163 *** 0.814 0.115 -2.134 *** 0.820 0.118 
Area (Rural area or village)         
Small or middle sized town 0.912  0.661 2.489 1.028  0.713 2.797 
Large town 0.869  0.843 2.385 0.980  0.862 2.665 
Interactions         
Tax or social security contributions + fine or prison x Tax morality 0.188  0.281 1.207 
Fairly high/ Very high x Tax morality     -0.179  0.264 0.836 
Constant -3.680 * 1.976 0.025 -3.704  2.273 0.025 
N 1,060 1,060 
Pseudo R2 0.3894 0.3969 
Log pseudolikelihood -58.1515 -57.4426 
Ȥ2 81.57 91.23 
p> 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: 
Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
All coefficients are compared to the benchmark category, shown in parentheses. 
When multiple imputation techniques are used (ten imputations were simulated through a system of chained 
equations for every missing value) for addressing the missing responses issue, the same variables are 
significantly associated with participation in the informal economy. Therefore, we use the available data, with no 
imputation, to keep minimize bias. 
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Table 3. Testing the competing perspectives towards explaining and tackling the informal 
economy and their interaction 
Hypothesis Result 
Rational economic actor 
H1a: the higher are the perceived penalties, the lower is the likelihood of 
participation in the informal economy, ceteris paribus. 
 
Refuted 
H1b: the higher is the perceived probability of detection, the lower is the 
likelihood of participation in the informal economy, ceteris paribus. 
Refuted 
Social actor 
H2: the higher the tax morality, the lower is the likelihood of participation in 
the informal economy, ceteris paribus. 
 
Confirmed 
Moderating effects hypothesis 
H3a: the higher the tax morality, the smaller the effect of perceived penalties 
on participation in the informal sector, ceteris paribus. 
 
Refuted 
H3b: the higher the tax morality, the smaller the effect of perceived risk of 
detection on participation in the informal sector, ceteris paribus. 
Refuted 
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Figure 1. Predicted probability of participating in informal economy RI D ³UHSUHVHQWDWLYH´
citizen living in United Kingdom: by expected sanctions, detection risk, and tax 
morality 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Variables used in the analysis: definitions and descriptive statistics (N = 1,060) 
Variables Definition Mode or mean Min / Max 
Engage in the informal 
economy (dependent 
variable) 
Dummy variable of undeclared paid activities 
carry out in the last 12 months, apart from a 
regular employment 
Not engaged in the 
informal economy (97%) 
0 / 1 
Expected sanctions Dummy for the penalties associated with 
participation in the informal economy 
Tax or social security 
contributions + fine or 
prison (81%) 
0 / 1 
Detection risk Dummy for the perceived risk of detection Fairly high/ Very high 
(51%) 
0 / 1 
Tax morality Constructed index of self-reported tolerance 
towards tax non-compliance 
1.97 1 / 10 
Gender Dummy for the gender of the respondent Female (51%) 0 / 1 
Age  Respondent exact age 47 years 15 / 93 
Occupation Respondent occupation in categories Employed (47%) 1 / 3 
People 15+ years in own 
household 
People 15+ years in respondent`s household 
(including the respondent) in categories 
Two (47%) 1 / 3 
Children Dummy for the presence of children (up to 14 
years old) in the household 
No children (68%) 0 / 1 
Difficulties paying bills Respondent difficulties in paying bills in 
categories 
Almost never/ never 
(71%) 
1 / 3 
Area Size of the area where the respondent lives in 
categories 
Small/ middle town 
(46%) 
1 / 3 
 
Table A2. Mean score of the acceptability of participating in six types of work in the informal 
economy (where 1 means absolutely unacceptable and 10 means absolutely acceptable) 
Type of work in the informal economy Mean 
score 
Someone receives welfare payments without entitlement 1.66 
An individual is hired by a household for work and s/he does not declare the payment received to the 
tax or social security authorities even though it should be declared 
2.64 
A firm is hired by a household for work and it does not declare the payment received to the tax or 
social security authorities 
1.93 
 
A firm is hired by another firm for work and it does not declare its activities to the tax or social 
security authorities 
1.77 
A firm hires an individual and all or a part of the wages paid to him/her are not officially declared 1.91 
Someone evades taxes by not declaring or only partially declaring their income 1.97 
 
